TMC rebel MPs seek three weeks to reply to Lok Sabha notice on disqualification plea

Indian Polity & Governance · 2 September 2026 · Based on The Hindu (original report)

2-minute summary

Twenty rebel Lok Sabha MPs from the Trinamool Congress (TMC), who aligned themselves with the Nationalist Citizens Party of India (NCPI) and joined the BJP-led NDA, have requested a three-week extension to reply to disqualification notices issued by Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla. The notices were issued following a petition filed by TMC leader Abhishek Banerjee under the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law). The development comes after the Supreme Court directed that the disqualification proceedings before the Speaker be dealt with expeditiously. The rebel camp is currently consulting legal experts to draft their defense, highlighting the ongoing institutional friction regarding the Speaker's role and the timelines for deciding defection cases.

Why it's in the news

Twenty rebel TMC Lok Sabha MPs have sought additional time to respond to disqualification notices issued by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, following a Supreme Court order directing the expeditious disposal of the petitions.

Background and context

The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, to curb political defections and bring stability to legislative bodies. It empowers the Speaker or Chairman of the House to decide on the disqualification of members who voluntarily give up party membership or vote against party whips. However, the law has faced criticism because it does not prescribe a statutory timeframe for the Speaker to make a decision, leading to allegations of partisan delays. In the landmark Kihoto Hollohan case (1992), the Supreme Court ruled that the Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review. More recently, in the Keisham Meghachandra Singh case (2020), the Supreme Court recommended that Parliament set up an independent tribunal to decide defection cases and suggested that Speakers should ideally decide such petitions within three months.

Constitutional provisions

• Tenth Schedule — Contains provisions regarding the disqualification of members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the ground of defection.
• Article 102(2) — Lays down that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of either House of Parliament if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.
• Article 191(2) — Lays down the corresponding disqualification provisions for members of State Legislative Assemblies or Councils under the Tenth Schedule.

Committees and reports

• Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms — Recommended that the power of deciding disqualification under the Tenth Schedule should be vested in the President or Governor, acting on the advice of the Election Commission, rather than the Speaker.
• Law Commission of India (170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws) — Recommended the deletion of provisions exempting splits from disqualification (which was later executed via the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003).

Previous UPSC questions on this theme

• Mains GS-2 2020 — 'Once a Speaker, Always a Speaker'! Do you think this practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India?

Mains practice: Analyze the role of the Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority under the Tenth Schedule. Does the lack of a statutory timeframe for deciding disqualification petitions undermine the spirit of the Anti-Defection Law?

The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, introduced by the 52nd Amendment Act in 1985, designates the Speaker or Chairman of the House as the sole authority to decide on the disqualification of legislators on grounds of defection. While acting under this Schedule, the Speaker functions as a quasi-judicial tribunal, a position validated by the Supreme Court in the Kihoto Hollohan case (1992).

However, the lack of a statutory timeframe for the Speaker to decide on these petitions significantly undermines the spirit of the Anti-Defection Law in the following ways:

• **Partisan Delays:** Since the Speaker is typically elected from the ruling party, they may deliberately delay decisions on disqualification petitions if the delay benefits the ruling coalition, thereby compromising the neutrality of the office.

• **Subversion of Democratic Mandate:** Defecting legislators often continue to hold ministerial berths or vote on crucial bills while their disqualification petitions remain pending indefinitely, defeating the core objective of curbing political opportunism.

• **Judicial Overreach vs. Separation of Powers:** The absence of a timeline forces the judiciary to intervene, as seen in the Keisham Meghachandra Singh case (2020), where the Supreme Court had to prescribe a reasonable timeline of three months, creating friction between the legislature and the judiciary.

To address these challenges, structural reforms are essential. The Dinesh Goswami Committee and the Law Commission have suggested transferring the adjudicating power to the President or Governor acting on the binding advice of the Election Commission. Alternatively, as suggested by the Supreme Court, Parliament should amend the Constitution to create an independent permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge to decide defection cases, thereby restoring public trust in legislative ethics.

Prelims practice questions

Q1. With reference to the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, consider the following statements: 1. The decision of the Speaker on disqualification on the ground of defection is completely immune from judicial review. 2. The Constitution does not prescribe any specific timeframe within which the Speaker must decide a disqualification petition. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

1. 1 only
2. 2 only
3. Both 1 and 2
4. Neither 1 nor 2

Answer: B. Statement 1 is incorrect: In the Kihoto Hollohan case (1992), the Supreme Court ruled that the Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review on grounds of malafides, perversity, etc. Statement 2 is correct: The Tenth Schedule does not prescribe any statutory or constitutional timeframe for the Speaker to decide on disqualification petitions.

Q2. Which of the following Constitutional Amendment Acts deleted the provision that protected defectors if they represented a 'split' of one-third of the members of a legislative party?

1. 86th Amendment Act, 2002
2. 91st Amendment Act, 2003
3. 52nd Amendment Act, 1985
4. 44th Amendment Act, 1978

Answer: B. The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, deleted the provision of the Tenth Schedule which protected a split of one-third of the members of a legislature party. Currently, only a merger involving at least two-thirds of the members of the legislative party is protected.

Q3. In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court suggest that Parliament should set up an independent permanent tribunal to decide disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule?

1. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
2. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu
3. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly
4. SR Bommai v. Union of India

Answer: C. In the Keisham Meghachandra Singh case (2020), the Supreme Court recommended that Parliament amend the Constitution to substitute the Speaker with an independent permanent tribunal (headed by a retired Supreme Court judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court) to decide defection cases.

Revision flashcards

• Which amendment introduced the Anti-Defection Law in India? The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, which added the Tenth Schedule.
• What is the current legal threshold for a party merger under the Tenth Schedule (as of September 2026)? At least two-thirds (2/3rd) of the members of the legislative party must agree to the merger to be exempt from disqualification.
• What was the key ruling in the Kihoto Hollohan case (1992)? The Supreme Court held that the Speaker acts as a tribunal under the Tenth Schedule, making their final decision subject to judicial review.
• Does the Speaker have the power to review their own decision under the Tenth Schedule? No, the Speaker does not have the power of review under the Tenth Schedule; once a decision is made, it can only be challenged via judicial review in courts.
• What timeframe did the Supreme Court recommend for deciding disqualification cases in the Keisham Meghachandra Singh case (2020)? The Supreme Court held that the Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period, which is outer limit of three months, barring exceptional circumstances.